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Abstract
The link between natural resource dependence and internal conﬂict has been approached
from a variety of angles in a large and growing interdisciplinary literature. While there is an
expanding consensus as to what matters the most for such intra-state violence episodes, the
feasibility - discontent dichotomy still appears to characterize a disciplinary divide between
economists and political scientists. This paper attempts to help bridge the gap by allow-
ing for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of potential rebels. Simple non-cooperative
bargaining yields a nonlinear impact of regulatory quality on the likelihood of conﬂict and
shows that corruption and resource depletion jointly aﬀect the outcome. The empirical anal-
ysis that follows looks at the eﬀect of environmental depletion and government corruption on
the emergence of civil conﬂicts using a large panel dataset. Resource depletion, the quality
of governance and their interaction are found to be signiﬁcant determinants of civil conﬂict
incidence. Results are robust to several steps taken to address potential endogeneity concerns.
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Resource-related violence is an important worldwide phenomenon. The stakes are sig-
niﬁcant, and there are both renewable and non-renewable resources involved, as Table 1
illustrates. According to some estimates, more than one in ﬁve wars around the world are
resource-based,2 and civil conﬂicts dwarf inter-state conﬂicts in terms of casualties, duration
and number of participants. This comparison is illustrated in Table 2 below.3 Substantial
case-study evidence exists of resource conﬂicts triggered by an insensitivity to local concerns
of an opportunistic government.4 Signiﬁcant eﬀort across disciplines has been expended in
trying to understand the root causes of and to ﬁnd solutions for resource-based conﬂicts.
The study of civil conﬂict is also becoming an increasingly prominent topic in development
economics, adding to a large and growing political science literature.
Combatant Resource Period Estimated revenues
UNITA (Angola) diamonds 1992-2001 4-4.2 bil.
RUF (Sierra Leone) diamonds 1990s 25-125 mil./yr
Taylor (Liberia) timber late 1990s 100-187mil./yr
Sudan government oil since 1999 400 mil./yr
Rwanda government coltan (from Congo) 1999-2000 250mil. total
Taliban Afghanistan opium, heroin etc. mid 1990s-2001 30-40 mil./yr
Northern Alliance Afghanistan opium, heroin, emeralds mid 1990s-2001 60 mil./yr
Khmer Rouge Cambodia timber mid 1990s 120-240 mil./yr
Cambodia government timber mid 1990s 100-150 mil./yr
Burma government timber mid 1990s 112 mil./yr
FARC (Colombia) cocaine late 1990s 140 mil./yr
Table 1: Estimated revenues from conflict resources: selected cases
Source: The Worldwatch Institute (2002)
The papers widely credited with spurring this empirical literature in economics have been
generated by the World Bank project on the Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence.
Analyzing 52 civil wars over a 40-year period (1960-1999), Collier and Hoeﬄer ﬁnd an inverse
U-shaped dependence of the likelihood of civil war on primary exports’ share in GDP.5 Some
subsequent studies have conﬁrmed the main thrust of the argument, while others have disputed
2 See Renner (2002), p. 6.
3 See Fearon and Laitin (2003), p. 75.
4 See Regan in Ballentine and Sherman (eds) (2003), p. 133-166 and Renner (2002), p. 40-47.
5 See Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), p. 23.
2the robustness of the ﬁndings, focusing mainly on the imprecision of the resource-dependence
measure and of some other controls, or on the deﬁnition of conﬂict. Others seek to be more
precise in the type of resources under analysis, e.g. oil versus non-oil resources, renewable
versus non-renewable, point versus diﬀuse, more versus less ‘lootable’,6 and in describing the
conditions that favour insurgency. Fearon and Laitin for instance argue that civil conﬂicts
are best explained by the presence of overpopulation, poverty, instability, which lower the
outside-options of recruits, and the existence of rough terrain, which decreases ﬁghting costs
for rebels. The majority of existing economic studies on the narrower topic of resource-based
conﬂicts are empirical, and the only robust determinants of civil conﬂict over which there is
consensus in the literature are income and population.7 However, due to the widely-recognized
under-theoretization of resource-conﬂicts, the choice of variables and speciﬁcations in many
models has very much been ad-hoc. As emphasized by Blattman and Miguel in an excellent
recent review, ‘...too little of the empirical literature is motivated by and clearly derived from
formal theoretical models.’8
Conflicts No. conflicts No.countries Casualties Duration (median)
Inter-state 25 25 3.33 mil. 3 months
Civil 127 73 16.2 mil. 6 years
Table 2: Inter-state versus Civil Conflicts
Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003), p.75.
The present paper contributes to addressing this lack by employing an empirical speciﬁ-
cation informed by a theoretical model of corruption-induced resource depletion and conﬂict.
Simple bargaining between a corrupt government and peasants living oﬀ the resource is intro-
duced ﬁrst, providing justiﬁcation for the investigation of an empirical relationship between
the likelihood for a particular country to be engaged in internal resource-based conﬂict and
the nature of its governance and natural resource policies. This model is thus employed to
inform the empirical speciﬁcation in an attempt to uncover a potential resource-based expla-
6 E.g. Le Billon (2001). A classiﬁcation of natural resources can be found in Lujala (2003).
7 See Hegre and Sambanis (2006), p. 509.
8 See Blattman and Miguel (JEL) 2009, p. 5.
3nation for civil conﬂict incidence: the impact of resource policies and quality of governance
on the prevalence of domestic conﬂict. The second part of the paper explores the relationship
between the incidence of resource-centered civil conﬂicts, the quality of governance and the
management of natural resources, using a large panel dataset including 120 countries over
a 20-year period. While in the previous studies broad inequality and ethnic fragmentation
variables were used to proxy for grievances, this channel is adapted and more closely explored
here by employing data speciﬁc to resource depletion. It is shown that income, population
level, the quality of governance, depletion and their interaction are signiﬁcant determinants
of civil conﬂicts and have the hypothesized signs.
Economic theory has largely regarded conﬂicts as competitions for resources between sym-
metrical parties maximizing ‘contest-success’ functions by allocating resources to productive
and military purposes. A comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
paper and the reader is referred to the thorough and informative very recent Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature piece by Blattman and Miguel (2010). The existing theoretical contributions
on the narrower topic of resource-based conﬂicts come primarily from political science, where
the emergence of civil conﬂicts is at a micro level primarily grounded in political grievances,
and at the macro level it is a consequence of the failure of the political system, whereby
dependence on resources weakens the state which becomes vulnerable to rebel challenges.9 In
sum, as Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) put it, a large political science literature on civil conﬂict
focuses on motives, ‘preferences’ for rebellion, while a small economics literature on conﬂict
is mostly concerned with opportunities or ‘constraints. (p. 564) In the spirit of Skaperdas
(2003), one can argue that both sides are important for understanding the issue and for arriv-
ing at correct policy prescriptions. A general distinction of ‘greed’ vs. ‘grievance’ motivation
for civil war is transparent in many of the earlier papers on the topic and a signiﬁcant part
9 See Ron (2005) and the special issue on Natural Resources and Violent Conﬂict of the Journal of Conﬂict
Resolution 49(4) for a balanced selection of recent political science papers.
4of the literature regards the rebel as a ‘national predator’ who ‘plunders the resource’.10
Focusing on incentives should not, however, preclude an analysis of policy-generated dis-
content.11 The real motivations of insurgents are diverse, likely change with time and are
in general diﬃcult to describe with certainty. The paper also oﬀers an economic view that
can accommodate both predatory greed and legitimate grievances as a possible motive for
social unrest. Following a recent trend, we move beyond the artiﬁcially strict greed-grievance
dichotomy posited in some of the earlier literature. It becomes obvious, after even a brief
familiarization with the existing body of case studies, that what characterizes most of the
conﬂicts related to natural resources is likely a combination of the two motives.12
The way these motivations play out in our setting is the following: the peasants have
preferences over both resource consumption and the rate of resource exploitation. While they
prefer a high current rate of consumption, a myopic resource policy by a corrupt government
which results in overexploitation may threaten their way of life in the long run. Depending on
parameters, the insurgents can be mainly greed or grievance-motivated. The setup allows to
show that natural resources can be a factor in episodes of civil violence via the inclusiveness
of their extraction regime - and not only appropriation - issues, and this may be especially
relevant to instances where conﬂicts arise in resource-scarce environments.13
10 See Ron (2005), p. 445. In introducing their case-study volume, Ballentine and Sherman emphasize
that ‘...most of the inﬂuential studies of the economics of conﬂict have focused exclusively on the predatory
behaviour of rebel or insurgent groups’. See Ballentine and Sherman (2003), p. 7.
11 Rus (2009) combines a political economy framework with a renewable resource exploitation model to
present a situation in which the overexploitation of a renewable resource by a corrupt government can generate
group-level discontent and conﬂict.
12 Weinstein (2005) argues that the rebel recruitment process can have important implications for solving
an adverse selection of insurgents problem, and that ‘grievance’ rebellion can be conﬁscated by ‘opportunistic’
rebellion when valuable resources are involved. While this may be true in some of the four cases cited, it is
unlikely that it characterizes all instances of civil war. Moreover, we are primarily interested in the conditions
for such conﬂicts to emerge, and not in their eventual metamorphoses.
13 E.g. Uganda, Rwanda, Nepal, Ethiopia, Eritrea etc.
5Collier and Hoeﬄer’s assumption in their ‘Greed or Grievance’ suite of papers was that in
every society and at all points in time there are marginalized groups that have an incentive to
overthrow the existing regime and that what distinguishes the peaceful and the violent cases
is merely the existence of economic opportunity that favours insurgency. While this statement
does have an intuitive appeal, it is unsatisfactory if one’s interest lies in explaining precisely
the circumstances that might lead to the disenfranchisement of certain groups in the society.
When the focus is on uncovering the conditions suﬃcient for civil violence to become the
preferred course of action by a certain party, a legitimate guiding question is: what caused
it and what can be done to prevent it? In the case of poor countries, the attractiveness
of looting is always a potential motivator, and the low outside options of recruits always a
facilitator in the slide toward violence. However, the way the resource is exploited and the
proceeds distributed in the wider society are bound to have an impact on the general level
of contentment with the government, while at the same time representing channels that have
the potential to ‘buy’ social peace.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.The second section motivates and presents a
simple bargaining model between an opportunistic government and potential rebels. The
third section introduces the data sources and discusses some important measurement issues.
The fourth section includes the empirical method, the model, identiﬁcation strategy and
results, while the last section summarizes and concludes.
2. A simple model of conﬂict over resources
This section proposes a very simple model of bargaining between a potentially corrupt
regulator in charge with administering the exploitation of a natural resource, and resource-
dependent and policy-sensitive peasants and potential rebels. The model captures both ‘greed’
and ‘grievance’ as possible motivations for reaching a non-cooperative violent outcome. Due
to its simplicity, the model does not claim to be a general characterization of circumstances
leading to resource-based conﬂicts. It’s goals are much more modest, namely to suggest a link
between the resource exploitation rate and the share of the resource revenues being allocated to
6potential insurgents and a rather loosely deﬁned ‘likelihood of conﬂict’. The conﬂict imagined
here is not a binary variable, but rather a continuous one which can be better understood
as peasants’ ‘unhappiness’ with the policy, which amounts to a certain degree of ‘violence’.
While civil conﬂicts can diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their intensity, they are classiﬁed as such in
the existing databases after having exceeded a certain threshold for violence.14 Thus, factors
contributing to the increase in the disutility of potential rebels are implicitly factors increasing
the likelihood of conﬂict.15
Standard economic analysis has traditionally found it diﬃcult to provide a justiﬁcation
for intra and inter-state violence. Since conﬂicts are so costly and outcomes unpredictable,
they should never occur when participants are rational agents, there are no uninternalized
externalities and there is perfect information and perfect contracting.16 This severely con-
strains the ability of classical theories to justify conﬂict. ‘Luckily’, all of these conditions
are likely violated in reality. Information asymmetries about each other’s capabilities may
translate not only in miscalculations of contest success, but also in conﬂict for signalling pur-
poses. With weak institutions, imperfect contracting means that commitment problems may
preclude a stable agreement between the parties. Before describing the strategic interaction,
one further point should be made clear here. The simple model presented does not purport to
oﬀer a general framework for bargaining failures leading to war, ` a la Fearon (1995) or Powell
(2006). We join most of the literature in taking such asymmetric information and imperfect
contracting models as rather convincing as we pursue a much more focused goal: that of
clarifying the nature of the interaction between resource depletion and governance quality for
resource-based conﬂicts. As it turns out, the eﬀect of regulatory corruption on the peasants
equilibrium payoﬀ can be positive or negative, depending on the level of resource depletion.
Here the threshold for peasants’ ‘unhappiness’ is assumed to be uncertain for both types
14 E.g. 25 conﬂict-related deaths in the PRIO/Uppsala data used here and described further below.
15 i.e. the likelihood that a certain level of violence will escalate enough to ‘be promoted’ to ‘conﬂict’ status.
16 For a comprehensive discussion see Blattman and Miguel (2010).
7of agents.17 For the government this may mean that it cannot assess with suﬃcient accuracy
the peasant’s tolerance and/or outside options, while for the peasants it may mean imperfect
knowledge about the outside options of the government and/or that they cannot anticipate
the likelihood that a certain utility level may be suﬃciently low to be instrumental in solving
their own collective action problem.18 Conﬂict can erupt due to a variety of deterministic
as well as stochastic factors - as documented in the literature. To preserve generality, we
only assume that -caeteris paribus- lowering the equilibrium utility of peasants decreases the
opportunity cots of a rebellion, and thus increases the likelihood of unrest. Since income is one
of the very few robust determinants of civil conﬂict in the empirical literature, this appears to
be a reasonable assumption. It also allows us to focus on the more speciﬁc conditions related
to resource exploitation and governance quality, while implicitly accounting for this ‘stylized
fact.’
There is a given level R of a resource and the government is characterized by a certain level
of opportunism β. This is referred to in the paper as myopia and/or corruption19 and it equates
the speed of resource extraction. It is a well-documented claim of insurgents in resource-based
conﬂicts that the self-interested government is myopically exploiting the resource at too high
a rate, primarily in order to increase the overall amounts it can embezzle.20 The government
keeps a fraction α of the proceeds for itself and shares the rest (1 − α) with the peasants,
for instance as public goods provision. Although resource extraction problems are inherently
dynamic, we aim to capture the essence of the problem in a one-shot game in order to keep the
model as simple as possible. Peasants (and potential rebels) have both extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations. We represent their utility in a subsistence consumption framework using a simple
17 E.g. the lowest tolerable value of peasants utility G has a stochastic component.
18 Regardless of motive, the occurrence of conﬂict hinges on insurgents solving a collective action problem.
19 The two are of course very diﬀerent, but indistinguishable in this simple framework.
20 E.g. Nigerian oil-rebels protesting extraction and agricultural land pollution without local compensation
or Cambodian ’forest-people’ opposing accelerated deforestation. For other examples see Renner (2002),
Homer-Dixon (1999).
8Stone-Geary type utility function:
G = (R
∗ − ¯ R)
γ(¯ β − δβ)
1−γ, (1)
where R∗ is the actual negotiated resource consumption by peasants, ¯ R is the given subsistence
level of resource consumption, ¯ β is a maximum ‘tolerable’ level of government opportunism,
δ is a parameter showing either sensitivity to government corruption or the distance between
actual and perceived corruption, γ is the greed parameter and its complement (1 − γ) is
the grievance parameter. The ﬁrst factor in the product requires a certain minimum level
of material consumption in order to obtain a positive level of utility, while the second factor
depends negatively on the government’s opportunism. This is the sense in which we talk about
‘grievance’ here: while a faster rate of extraction increases today’s pie and the share that can
be obtained by the peasants via bargaining, they also derive disutility from knowing the
resource is potentially being depleted at a faster rate than optimal. While the government
is perhaps more heavily discounting the future because of a limited political horizon, the
peasants - resource dependent for generations - may have lower rates of time preference.
Suppose the government sets the extraction rate βR and it bargains with the peasants
over rent distribution. Denote the government’s payoﬀ by E = αβR, and the peasants’
share (1 − α)βR. The Nash Bargaining solution concept is chosen for its robustness and
simplicity (the outcome coincides simultaneously with a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social
planner’s division). The solution entails choosing the optimal share α to solve the following
maximization problem:
Max
α
￿
(E − ¯ E)(G − ¯ G)
￿
, (2)
where ¯ E and ¯ G represent the outside options for government and peasants, respectively.
Given the simple functional forms speciﬁed above (2) becomes:
Max
α
n
(αβR − ¯ E)
￿
[(1 − α)βR − ¯ R]
γ(¯ β − δβ)
1−γ − ¯ G
￿o
. (3)
To simplify the algebra, we can normalize one of the threat points to zero. Assume, without
loss of generality, that ¯ G = 0. Then, the ﬁrst order condition yields: α = 1
γ+1 +
γ ¯ E− ¯ R
βR(γ+1) and
9(1−α) =
γ
γ+1 −
γ ¯ E− ¯ R
(γ+1)βR as the equilibrium rent-splitting rule between the government and the
peasants. The equilibrium payoﬀ of the peasants is then equal to G∗ =
h
γ(βR− ¯ E− ¯ R)
γ+1
iγ
(¯ β −
δβ)1−γ.
As motivated above, we are interested in how this utility changes with the level of gov-
ernment corruption.21 It is a priori ambiguous whether more corrupt governments increase or
decrease the welfare of locals, given their preferences over both material resources and gover-
nance quality. On one hand, a higher β increases the size of the surplus to be divided, on the
other hand it creates dissatisfaction. We focus on the non-trivial solutions for which positive
utility levels G∗ obtain, which is whenever ¯ β − δβ > 0 ⇔ β <
¯ β
δ and
γ(βR− ¯ R)
γ+1 > 0 ⇔ R >
¯ R
β.
Under these conditions, ∂G∗
∂β > 0 whenever
R
￿
γ(γ¯ β − δβ)
δ(1 − γ)
￿
> −γ( ¯ E + ¯ R). (4)
Since the right-hand side expression in (4) is negative, the inequality is satisﬁed for any
level of the resource R when its coeﬃcient is positive, i.e. if γ >
δβ
¯ β , or if the peasants are
‘greedy enough’ that they can be appeased with resource transfers. If however this is not
the case and in fact the peasants are less greedy and more concerned about the quality of
governance: γ <
δβ
¯ β , the left-hand-side of expression (4) becomes negative as well. Then
∂G∗
∂β > 0 obtains when:
R <
δ(1 − γ)( ¯ E + ¯ R)
δβ − γ¯ β
≡ ˜ R. (5)
The intuition for these results is the following. When peasants are relatively greedy, a more
opportunistic government sets a higher rate of resource exploitation and implicitly increases
their consumption of the resource, while increasing their disutility from bad governance pro-
portionately less. This in turn increases the potential rebels’ equilibrium utility and thus it
reduces the likelihood a conﬂict centred around re-distribution should occur. When peasants
are relatively less greedy and whenever the resource is suﬃciently large so that the inverse
21 In a dynamic framework the simple game could be extended to include a ﬁrst stage in which the govern-
ment ‘chooses’ its corruption level and implicitly the resource exploitation rate, then bargaining occurs.
10of (5) is true, higher government corruption decreases their equilibrium utility and increases
their discontent. This can then increase the probability that potential rebels will solve their
collective action problem and initiate conﬂict. Whenever the peasants are less greedy but the
resource is suﬃciently depleted so that (5) holds, more government corruption has the eﬀect
of increasing their equilibrium level of utility and lowering their discontent, thus decreasing
the chances of a rebellion.
The main implications of this simple model can be summarized as follows. When potential
rebels have both material and governance quality motivations, their equilibrium level of utility
- a proxy for their willingness to rebel and for their success in overcoming the collective action
hurdle - is an important determinant of the probability of civil conﬂict. Even though the
technology of conﬂict is left unspeciﬁed to preserve generality, looking at comparative statics
of this equilibrium utility gives information about the probability of seeing a resource-centered
civil conﬂict in the data. Thus we expect that the quality of governance and resource depletion
are jointly inﬂuencing the incidence of civil violence. While in general higher government
corruption augments the policy disutility component of peasants’ objective and thus increases
the likelihood of conﬂict, in very depleted environments, it may actually reduce it.
When taking the implications of such a simple model to data, several qualiﬁcations and
caveats are in order. By linking the probability of conﬂict to welfare, we implicitly assumed
conﬂicts are less likely where income level and growth is higher. Thus, even though we have
not speciﬁcally included a variable for outside opportunities in the model, we do expect income
to be a leading correlate of conﬂict. Also, by considering civil violence to be the only channel
for regime change, we assumed away the democratic channel. Generally we expect more
democratic countries to have less conﬂicts. By focusing exclusively on resource extraction
and distribution, we also ignored other leading motivations, such as ethnic separatism. To
minimize the distance between the simple model and the diversity of motivations and realities,
we control for such factors in the following empirical exercises. The rest of the paper presents
the data, the empirical model and examines the merits of these ﬁndings in the sample.
113. Data
To assemble the panel data set we require information on natural resources, civil conﬂicts,
governance and corruption, democracy and general macro-economic variables such as GDP
level and growth or population. Several diﬀerent sources are used for this purpose. A complete
list of variables and their sources is provided in the Appendix, and a brief introduction is
provided in the following paragraphs.
The natural resource data comes from the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings database,
which provide general measures of economics sustainability. The ANS project provides infor-
mation since 1970 for a wide cross-section of countries on several indicators relevant to our
main focus, such as: net forest depletion, mineral depletion, energy depletion, CO2 pollution
damage.22 For example the net forest depletion calculation is based of estimated depletion
rents, ‘calculated as the rent on that amount of extraction which exceeded the natural incre-
ment in wood volume.’ One caveat is in order here: the calculation of rents includes several
price components, among which a ‘regional price’. To be exact, this is not a unique exoge-
nously determined international price, but is calculated using export quantities and values
for every country and averaged at a regional level. While individual country data is also
available, and its use would even more closely reﬂect local scarcity rents, it is considered
to be too noisy.23 This data source has an advantage over the traditional measures of re-
source abundance/dependence used in the resource curse literature, such as the proportion
of primary exports in GDP, since it overcomes the endogeneity concerns associated with the
measure. Conﬂict and/or corruption perception may inﬂuence the level of economic activity
and thus the denominator of the measure. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) take issue with
the treatment of resource dependence (share of primary exports in GDP) as resource abun-
22 Adjusted net savings are calculated as augmented standard national income accounting ﬁgures de-
ﬂated by the Gross National Income (GNI). More information is provided in the World Bank manual at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/1105643-1115814965717/20486606/Savingsmanual2002.pdf
23 I am indebted to Edward Barbier for pointing out the (in)appropriateness of some of these indicators.
12dance, and the exogenous treatment of what may essentially be an endogenously determined
variable. Alexeev and Conrad (2008) also caution against using bias-inducing export-related
GDP shares. For this reason, despite the aforementioned caveats, this database is the one
preferred by most recent contributions to the ﬁeld, notably Collier and Hoeﬄer (2009) and
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009).
Civil conﬂict data was obtained from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conﬂict Dataset24 which
- compared to previous eﬀorts - extends the conﬂicts set by lowering the casualty threshold
necessary for an episode of violence to qualify as a conﬂict from 1000, in the Correlates of
War (C.O.W) project,25 to 25-battle related deaths annually, while also keeping track of the
intensity of the war. Thus, these data are much more comprehensive, capturing not only the
major civil conﬂicts worldwide, but also many more smaller scale episodes of violence over
the period 1946-2005. Since we are focusing on resource-based conﬂicts which erupt when
disgruntled former peasants turn into rebels, this inclusiveness makes the data source most
appropriate for our purposes here. The operational deﬁnition of conﬂict used in the database
is ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths.’26 The dataset also includes inter-state conﬂicts, however, in
accordance to the stated interest, only the internal ones are kept.27 While most of the previous
empirical studies use the much more restrictive 1000 casualties per year threshold, the position
expressed here is the following: whereas that body of work looks actually to identify the factors
important in reaching a war-level intensity of hostilities, this data allows to test more directly
for determinants of civil conﬂict emergence. Moreover, data comprehensiveness is important
for our identiﬁcation strategy, as explained a little further.
24 See Gleditsch et al 2002.
25 Started by Singer and Small in 1972 at the University of Michigan, transferred to Penn State in 2001.
26 See UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset Codebook, p. 4.
27 Categories 3 and 4, for ‘internal armed conﬂict’ and ‘internationalized internal armed conﬂict’, the latter
group including civil wars that witness some form of external interference.
13Reliable data about corruption and the general quality of governance are diﬃcult to collect,
due to the very nature of the phenomenon, premised on concealing its existence. Therefore
all data sources available for a wide array of countries and time periods are not based on
factual data, but rather on perceptions.28 These perception-based corruption indicators are
constructed with information from multiple sources, and so there are less chances of any
systematic bias or measurement error. Among the most prominent in this category of sources,
one can count the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index started in 1995
with 41 countries gradually expanded to 158 in the present, the International Country Risk
Guide which looks speciﬁcally at corruption in the political system, and the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators.
The source for corruption data used here is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
score,29 which refers speciﬁcally to corruption in the political system and to ties between
business and politics. There are a number of governance indicators available, such as: Gov-
ernment Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Proﬁle, Military in Politics, Religion
in Politics, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability, Bureaucracy Quality
and Corruption, with the last two being the more relevant to the present focus. In partic-
ular, the measure of corruption refers to ‘ﬁnancial corruption in the form of demands for
special payments and bribes...and suspiciously close ties between politics and business’.30 As
with all ICRG indicators, higher values of variables corruption and bureaucratic quality
(bur.quality for short) signify better quality governance: less corruption and higher bu-
28 Several studies analyze the distance between perception indicators and more factual-based measures of
corruption. See Olken (2006) for a recent example, where a local measure of corruption in road-building in
Indonesia is compared with corruption perceptions. Though interesting, this is not a signiﬁcant problem in
the present setting, where perceived mismanagement and embezzlement of public funds can equally generate
revolt.
29 International Country Risk Guide (Table 3B), C The PRS Group, Inc., 1984-Present. For more details
see http : //www.prsgroup.com.
30 Quotation from the ICRG codebook A Business Guide to Political Risk for International Decisions, p.
31.
14Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
           
GDP growth  4238  3.287308  6.115611  -51.03086  106.2798 
GDP per capita (PPP)  3906  8189.072  8563.14  466.1966  66702.59 
Food exports  2798  25.23914  25.30327  .000238  99.11278 
Fuel exports  2681  15.95988  25.86532  0  101.5603 
Metal ore exports  2747  6.291353  11.86478  3.36e-06  88.81229 
Gini coefficient  400  41.1678  10.80784  19.4  74.33 
Aid  3267      8.251895      13.82001  -3.016838  242.2864 
Aid per capita  3521      80.30627       215.12    -203.5889     2337.979 
Population  4728  1.45e+08  5.95e+08  19700  6.44e+09 
Rural population density  4013  555.3755  1121.809  0  13776.82 
Subsidies and transfers  975  36.21356  21.67086  -.7346081  90.65208 
Surface area  4536  3374.076  12867.36  .05  134000 
Unemployment youth male  1178  16.37603  9.214946  1  69.2 
Polity (democracy indicator)  3158  1.548132  7.255555  -10  10 
Bureaucratic quality  2889  2.139171  1.20512  0  4 
Control of corruption  2889  3.13674  1.382194  0  6.166667 
Democratic accountability  2889  3.612924  1.646162  0  6 
Conflict intensity  640  1.326563  .4693225  1  2 
Peace before conflict  945  4.445503  9.4801  0  50 
In conflict   945  .6772487  .4677761  0  1 
ANS energy depletion  3582  4.217113  10.22142  0  79.12 
ANS mineral depletion  3596  .7258843  3.002218  0  56.95 
ANS net forest depletion  3139  .5396974  1.559226  0  15.97 
           
 
      Figure 1: Summary statistics - selected variables
reaucratic quality, respectively.
Additional controls incorporated in the data set come from World Bank’s Development
Indicators for variables such as: GDP levels and growth rates, population, agricultural prod-
ucts, food and ore exports, measures of inequality, unemployment, foreign aid and others.
Additionally, data from the POLITY IV project were used to account for the general level of
democracy in a country in the form of a special variable (polity2) designed speciﬁcally for
time-series analyses.31 While we use it in some robustness checks, the main regressions do not
include the democracy variable. Although it has been used in the literature on resource curse
31 This variable is obtained as a diﬀerence between the democracy and the autocracy scores for each
country and year. For a thorough explanation of why a modiﬁcation of the combined polity score is neces-
sary, please refer to the original source: Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual at
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity.
15and even in some studies of civil conﬂict, one component in the democracy score compilation
is the existence of a civil conﬂict, which renders it endogenous to our framework.32
 
Variables  gdp  gwth  pop  pol  bqua  cor  mid  nfd  end 
                   
Gdp per capita  1.00                 
Gdp growth  -0.06  1.00               
Population   -0.06  0.14  1.00             
Polity   0.46  -0.07  -0.07  1.00           
Bureaucatic quality  0.78  -0.03  0.05  0.40  1.00         
Corruption control  0.62  -0.06  -0.09  0.41  0.64  1.00       
Mineral depletion  -0.16  -0.02  -0.02  -0.00  -0.10  -0.06  1.00     
Net forest depletion  -0.25  0.05  0.00  -0.17  -0.28  -0.18  -0.03  1.00   
Energy depletion  -0.07  0.09  -0.00  -0.43  -0.13  -0.23  -0.08  -0.12  1.00 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 2: Cross-correlations.
Figure 1 lists some of the variables included in the compiled dataset. Unconditional
correlations between important variables are presented in Figure 2. Two relationships are
particularly worth pointing out in this cross-correlations table. First, the ICRG indicators
of corruption and bureaucratic quality, are positively and quite strongly correlated with the
level of income in a country, while bearing little relationship with the income growth rate.
Our results are presented mainly using income growth, although regressions including income
levels are provided as well for robustness. Secondly, collinearity between independent variables
is a concern. Investigating genuine savings, Dietz, Newmayer and de Soysa (2007) present
a limited reduced-form dependence between corruption control, resource dependence33 and
genuine savings, although they cannot address the endogeneity of corruption. Moreover, their
focus on sustainability and investment in non-natural capital to compensate for a high rate
of resource extraction is somewhat complementary to ours.34 Although we do not focus on
32 See Blattman and Miguel (2010). p. 28.
33 Their measure of resource dependence is average share of fuel and minerals in total exports, which
can be interpreted as a measure of resource dependence and contains total exports in the denominator of
one explanatory variable and income level and growth as separate regressors. See Brunnschweiler and Bulte
(2008) for a discussion of why this may be problematic.
34 The fuel and mineral exports as a percentage in total exports does not yield a reliable measure of the
16genuine savings, but only on speciﬁc resource-depletion components (without investments in
produced and human capital), we ask whether governance quality indicators and resource
depletion indicators are correlated in the sample. The correlations between the indicators of
depletion and corruption over the sample are low, while bearing the expected signs.35
4. Empirical Method and Results
Following the discussion in the ﬁrst part of this paper, we undertake in this section the
investigation of the impact of resource depletion and government corruption on civil conﬂict
incidence. We analyze the relationship between the incidence of internal violence, resource
depletion and the quality of governance in a wide cross section of countries over the 1984-2004
period. The only correlates of civil war that are consistently robust in the empirical literature
are income level and/or growth - displaying a negative relationship - and population levels
- having a positive relationship - with the incidence of domestic violence. Intuitively, the
opportunity cost of participating in an armed insurgency is higher in a high average-income
country, while a larger population per se may increase the probability that one particular group
may rebel against the government, in a territorial dispute or in a coup. Beyond these two
factors, however, there is little agreement in the ﬁeld. Collier and Hoeﬄer’s stark initial claims
identifying rebellion with a ‘quasi-criminal activity’, based on their ﬁndings that dependence
on primary commodity exports are an important determinant in the emergence of civil wars,
still stands in contrast to theoretical work in political science as well as case study evidence,
which provide examples of grievance-based uprisings. While many papers concentrate on
extraction rate, however, in the absence of stock data. The measurement problems are composed by the the
underestimation of genuine savings in the world Bank database, which may be systematically correlated with
corruption, in that a corrupt government may invest less of the resource proceeds in other forms of capital.
35 We also investigate collinearity by checking the stability of estimates to small perturbations in potentially
collinear regressors. We use Stata command perturb which is particularly appropriate as a collinearity
diagnostic for nonlinear speciﬁcations, interaction terms and limited dependence variables, and we do not ﬁnd
evidence of strong collinearity between governance and depletion variables in the sample.
17attempting to replicate Collier and Hoeﬄer’s results using diﬀerent deﬁnitions, time periods
or conﬂict data sets, few actually move forward and look for other convincing explanations.
One chief reason for this may have been that the body of theoretical literature to guide such
empirical explorations is relatively slim.
Civil wars may have their origin in several diﬀerent social phenomena. One potential source
of resource-based conﬂicts is investigated here, namely natural resource-related rebellion. The
simple model presented above describes a resource-based motive for internal violence in a
framework which allowed for extrinsic (i.e. ‘greed’) as well as intrinsic (i.e. ‘grievance’)
motivations of potential rebels. Previously, the proxies used for grievances were broad and
political-based: level of democracy and measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization.36
Given the relatively large number of what appear to be resource-based conﬂicts out of the total
civil conﬂicts, an additional way one can think about resource exploitation grievances and the
quality of the governance as factors leading a certain group to consider conﬂict was suggested
above. The resource depletion data on net forest depletion and mineral depletion are used
to proxy for the level of resource exploitation, and governance indicators on corruption and
bureaucracy quality represent the quality of policy-making. Following the insights gained in
the theory part, the governance quality terms are also interacted with the depletion indicators.
The basic probit speciﬁcation (lags are omitted for simplicity) can be written as follows:
Φ
−1(Conflictit) = β0 + β1Incomeit + β2Populationit + β3Gov.Qualityit + (6)
+β4Depletionit + β5(Gov.Quality ∗ Depletion)it + β6Zit + νi + ǫit,
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function, incomeit is either the level of
GDP per capita level (purchasing power parity) or GDP growth, Z includes other controls
and i indexes the panels (countries), t is time measured in years, νi is the panel-speciﬁc,
unobserved heterogeneity eﬀect and ǫit is the error term.37
36 On the latter, some studies argue that it could be also interpreted as preventing conﬂict, since rebel
recruitment is more diﬃcult in more fragmented societies. More on this later in the paper.
37 Φ(z) ≡
R z
−∞(2π)−1/2exp(−x2/2)dx. Alternatively, the speciﬁcation could be expressed as:
18Income variables have been widely used as a controls in regressions of civil conﬂict. A
higher income level represents a high level of outside opportunities, with the eﬀect of decreas-
ing both potential government policy-related grievances and the numbers of potential rebels.38
In an innovative paper that uses rainfall as an instrument for economic growth, Miguel et
al. (2004) show that income growth is also a signiﬁcant determinant of domestic conﬂict in
Africa. Note that, although rainfall data exists for a wider cross-section of countries, this
identiﬁcation strategy is not available here, since rainfall instruments for economic growth
only in a particular subset of agriculture-dependent economies where irrigation is lacking,
such as Sub-Saharan Africa. If group-level discontent related to the way an opportunistic
government manages exploitation and distribution in the economy are among the causes of
conﬂicts on average, we expect the control of corruption and the quality of the bureaucracy
to generally decrease the likelihood a domestic conﬂict ensues, while the depletion indicators
should increase it. We also expect that depletion and governance quality jointly inﬂuence
the incidence of conﬂicts. For relatively depleted environments, the conﬂict-inducing eﬀect
of depletion decreases with corruption, which implies that the likelihood of conﬂict should be
lower, the lower the ICRG corruption control score for these countries. Therefore, while the
marginal eﬀect of corruption control and bureaucratic quality are expected to be negative,
the eﬀect of the interaction term between the governance score and the depletion indicator
is hypothesized to be positive. The estimation method is panel probit.39 We explore random
eﬀects probit, panel probit, pooled probit, ﬁxed eﬀects panel logit, OLS and IV models. The
Probability(Conflictit = 1) = Φ(β · Z), where β and Z are, respectively, the vectors of coeﬃcients and
regressors.
38 Recall that this aspect is implicitly incorporated in our simple bargaining model.
39 The ﬁrst table (in Figure 3) presents a random eﬀects probit model. Our choice in this exercise is some-
what conditioned by the software package capabilities. According to Stata Manual, ‘There is no command
for a conditional ﬁxed eﬀects model, as there does not exists a suﬃcient statistic allowing the ﬁxed eﬀects to
be conditioned out of the likelihood’. Results from a panel ﬁxed eﬀects logit model are also reported in the
appendix.
19results are summarized in the following tables, starting with Figure 3.
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Variables 
 
       Dependent variable: inconflict5 (PanelProbit) 
        (1)                 (2)                   (3)                 (4)                  
         
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.0230***  -0.0247***  -0.0164**  -0.0195*** 
  (0.00848)  (0.00854)  (0.00732)  (0.00745) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.860***  0.888***  0.928***  0.913*** 
  (0.292)  (0.266)  (0.256)  (0.257) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.605***    -0.519***   
  (0.0998)    (0.0917)   
Corruption control (lag)    -0.481***    -0.396*** 
    (0.0880)    (0.0776) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.309**  -0.488**     
  (0.144)  (0.206)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)      -0.0505*  -0.0835*** 
      (0.0263)  (0.0323) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.236***       
  (0.0911)       
Corruption*ForestDep (lag)    0.159***     
    (0.0609)     
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)      0.0948***   
      (0.0259)   
Corruption*MinDep (lag)        0.0604*** 
        (0.0175) 
Year  -0.120***  -0.128***  -0.120***  -0.124*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0112)  (0.0110)  (0.0111) 
Constant  233.2***  249.6***  232.5***  240.4*** 
  (22.02)  (21.93)  (21.46)  (21.69) 
Observations  2419  2419  2486  2486 
Groups  130  130  133  133 
         
Figure 3: Civil conﬂict incidence
As expected, income growth has a discouraging eﬀect on conﬂicts: when the economy is
growing and good alternative options exist, participating in a rebellion is much less appeal-
ing.40 Also, the natural logarithm of population level has a positive and strongly signiﬁcant
eﬀect, conﬁrming the ﬁndings in the literature. In addition, both governance variables chosen
(bureaucratic quality and corruption control) have negative and strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
40Appendix Table 7 reports the same regressions, but using income level instead of the growth rate.
20cients, seemingly indicating that conﬂict incidence is inversely related to good quality gov-
ernance. However, the model includes the interaction term between governance quality and
resource depletion indicators, therefore the marginal eﬀects are not equal to the coeﬃcients,
and need to be calculated separately.41 We follow a simple post-estimation calculation proce-
dure in which the marginal eﬀect of a regressor participant in an interaction term is calculated
as the derivative of a function of the predicted coeﬃcients as well as the mean-centered regres-
sors.42 Calculating the marginal eﬀects of the quality of governance and depletion variables
conﬁrm that the forest depletion increases the likelihood of conﬂict in columns 1 and 2, while
the bureaucratic quality and corruption control both decrease the likelihood of conﬂict. The
same results obtain in the case of mineral depletion combined in turns with bureaucratic
quality and control of corruption in columns 3 and 4, respectively. As the appendix reports,
the results for energy depletion are consistently diﬀerent, conﬁrming the vague consensus in
the empirical literature that the dominant energy resource - oil - ‘is diﬀerent’.43 These results
provide some support to our thesis that quality of governance and resource depletion matter
for civil conﬂicts.
Moreover, the interaction term between the quality of governance variable and the deple-
tion indicator is positively signiﬁcant for both forest and mineral depletion. This statistical
signiﬁcance is interpreted to mean that the eﬀect of resource depletion on the incidence of civil
conﬂicts is dependent on the governance variable (here control of corruption and bureaucratic
quality), as hypothesized. Moreover, the relationship between the prevalence of conﬂict and
41 See Norton and Ai (2003) for a thorough explanation of this point. Table 15 in the Appendix plots the
correct marginal eﬀect of the interaction in a baseline probit model.
42 Details and code available upon request. Also see Stata at http :
//www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/mfx interact.html.
43 Fearon’s thesis is that ‘oil is diﬀerent’. He dismisses the greed interpretation of the association between
some commodity exports with civil war, and states that ‘...an empirically more plausible [...] explanation is
that oil exporters are more prone to civil war because they tend to have weaker state institutions than other
countries with the same per capita income’. (italics mine) See Fearon (2005).
21the governance variable also appears to exhibit the characteristics proposed in the theoret-
ical section. While the (previous period) control of corruption and bureaucratic quality are
negative and strongly signiﬁcant, the interaction with the indicator of net forest depletion
and mineral depletion it is positive and signiﬁcant. These results provide some additional
support for the hypothesis derived in the theoretical section: while a poor governance quality
is positively correlated with the incidence of civil conﬂicts, its eﬀect is lower given a high level
of environmental depletion.
Since institutional variables are among the regressors, reverse causality running from con-
ﬂict to governance quality is clearly a potential problem. It could be argued that a high
degree of corruption and resource exploitation might be due to the presence of conﬂict, which
shortens the time in oﬃce horizon contemplated by opportunistic bureaucrats and incentivizes
them to behave in a more corrupt fashion. In an unstable environment, the government bu-
reaucrats may have short appointment horizons and might be attempting to make up for this
‘shortcoming’ by accepting side-payments in exchange for policy favours, and consequently
the quality of governance decreases, exacerbating overexploitation. This problem is common
to most of the papers in the literature and is particularly severe for cross-sectional studies.
As a ﬁrst step to account for such reverse causation, the analysis here takes advantage of the
time structure of the data set and uses time lags for all right-hand-side variables, while the
dependent variable is ‘forward-looking’ by construction. Secondly, there is another advan-
tage, besides comprehensiveness, to adopting a lower death-threshold when deﬁning conﬂicts,
which is worth pointing out in this context. It could be argued that attempts to rule out
reverse causality by using one period-lagged regressors are not fool-proof, since adverse conse-
quences of the civil war on governance quality can occur early, before the typical 1000-battle
related deaths threshold is reached. However, the particular conﬂict database used here al-
lows for a very early detection of violence (25 battle related deaths), so that the likelihood of
anticipatory behavior from the regulator is reduced.
Alternatively, the results might be spurious: perhaps the relationship captures the fact
that both sets of variables are trending, or perhaps there exists a factor that is not included in
22the regressions and that inﬂuences both the incidence of conﬂict and the governance quality
variable. The latter source of spuriousness is investigated below by instrumenting for the
quality of governance. The former is ruled out by including a time trend, and results do
not change, except for slight increase in the signiﬁcance of income growth and population
variables.
Variables 
 
 
(1) Forest 
Depletion 
(2) Forest 
variables 
(3) Mineral 
 
(4) Mineral 
         
Inconflict  -0.178**  -0.154**  -0.174  -0.215 
  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.172)  (0.171) 
Inconflict5  0.074  0.101  -0.799***  -0.860*** 
  (0.100)  (0.098)  (0.239)  (0.234) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  -0.985  -1.597  17.314***  18.150*** 
  (1.343)  (1.290)  (3.184)  (3.078) 
Observations  591  591  598  598 
Groups  51  51  51  51 
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Figure 4: Depletion and conﬂict
There is yet another potential source of endogeneity that we are concerned about: perhaps
conﬂicts drive resource exploitation and not the other way around, in order -for example - to
provide resources which can be used in the battle. Do conﬂicts on average intensify resource
exploitation? As a ﬁrst pass in addressing the possibility of reverse causation between deple-
tion and conﬂict, we show in Figure 4 how the main conﬂict indicator, inconflict5, which
is a dummy that turns one when civil conﬂict occurs within ﬁve years from the observation
year,44 is not a signiﬁcant determinant of forest depletion, and it negatively aﬀects mineral
44 This time horizon is chosen for compatibility with the previous literature. A non-binary alternative is
intensitymax5, which measures the maximum intensity of conﬂicts in a country during a period of 5 years
from the observation year. However, the variability of this indicator is also limited, as it is zero for cases
where conﬂict is absent, one for minor conﬂict and two for large-scale civil war.
23depletion. It appears that the anticipation of future conﬂict does not encourage current-
period over-exploitation of forest resources in the sample. On the other hand, the dummy for
contemporaneous conﬂict inconflict is a signiﬁcant determinant of net forest depletion in
both regressions, but is associated with lower exploitation, and it is not a signiﬁcant factor
for mineral depletion. The controls include the governance quality indicators: bureaucratic
quality in columns 1 and 3 and corruption control in 2 and 4. The two conﬂict dummies are
never signiﬁcant determinants of resource depletion when entered in such regressions alone,
without the additional controls.
Finally, some of the right-hand side variables may be jointly determined: low quality
governance, or institutions may be the result of high levels of income per capita. This is the
issue to which the analysis turns next.45 Studying the role of institutions is diﬃcult, given
their plausible endogeneity to almost any conceivable model speciﬁcation. Good instrumental
variables are not easily available, and the practice has been to rely on the few ones coming
mostly from the cross-country development literature. La Porta et al (1998, 1999) establish
that the legal origin of the country is a salient determinant of the legal protection of investors
and thus of economic development.46 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show that
settlers mortality, available for 64 countries, is a good indicator for the type of institutions
created by Europeans in the colonies, especially with regards to property rights protection.
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) present data on the antiquity of the state and
argue for its usefulness as an instrument for the quality of institutions, if one is ready to
accept a long-run learning-by-doing process in governance. While the strength of property
rights is, undeniably, crucial for development, it is less of an issue in view of the theoretical
framework, where we assume property rights are reasonably enforced. In the ﬁrst stage data
45 The quality of institutions has an overwhelming impact on the process of economic development, taking
precedence over classical factors such as geography and trade, as shown in Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi
(2002). Presumably, they also are an important ingredient in the prevalence for domestic violence in society.
46 The categories are British, French, Scandinavian, German and Socialist origin of the legal system. See
La Porta et al.(1999).
24on state antiquity and legal origin is used, which are the more reasonable instruments for
the quality of institutions in the sense used here, while also implying the smallest restriction
of the sample of countries. In addition to being correlated with the potentially endogenous
variable - here the quality of governance - valid instruments have to also satisfy the exclusion
restriction, i.e. they have to not be signiﬁcant determinants of conﬂicts on their own. While
this is plausible for the antiquity of the state, which likely does not have an impact on civil
conﬂicts directly or through the other regressors than the one it instruments for, legal origin
may determine the economic regressors. However, when only state antiquity is used as an
instrument, the results do not change, apart from some decreases in the level of signiﬁcance.47
An instrumental variable approach is implemented in an two-stage least squares frame-
work, which is preferable to a panel probit in the presence of endogeneity bias. This approach
was previously followed in Miguel et al (2004).48 Moreover, the OLS results can be given
an easier interpretation. In the ﬁrst stage we regress the quality of governance indicators on
the instruments and additional controls. The antiquity of the state (statehist05) and the
legal origin (legor) indeed emerge as preferred instruments and their quality is better for the
case of bureaucratic quality. Then we run the IV regression of conﬂict incidence on the in-
strumented endogenous and hypothesized exogenous regressors and the results are presented
in the table in Figure 5, where we report heteroskedasticity-robust coeﬃcients and clustered
standard errors. In alternating columns we ﬁrst run a panel OLS, followed by the instrumen-
tal variable regression. The governance quality variable is bureaucratic quality, which is more
correlated with the instruments. The appendix provides the results for when corruption con-
trol is chosen as the governance quality variable instead. We repeat this for forest depletion
and mineral depletion.
47 These results are also reported in the Appendix Tables 10 and 11.
48 See also Wooldridge (2002). Miguel et al (2004) argue that the Rivers and Vuong (1998) two-stage
conditional maximum likelihood estimator method designed for cross-sectional analysis ‘requires strong spec-
iﬁcation assumptions’ to be translatable to panel data (p. 738). The same idea is expressed in Elbadawi and
Sambanis (2002), p. 327.
25Notice that most of the results that were previously emphasized survive in the regressions
where the quality of governance is instrumented for: income growth is generally negative
and signiﬁcant, population is generally positive and signiﬁcant, the quality of governance
is negative and generally signiﬁcant and the interaction between bureaucratic quality and
net forest depletion is positive and signiﬁcant.49 Also, the interaction between bureaucratic
quality and mineral depletion loses signiﬁcance once bureaucratic quality is instrumented for
in column 4. The marginal eﬀects of depletion and of quality of governance on the likelihood
of civil conﬂict are mostly signiﬁcant and have the ‘right’ signs, thus providing a stronger
conﬁrmation of the hypotheses.50
In the admittedly simplistic theoretical model which was used to inform the empirical
speciﬁcation, only resource policy can lead to conﬂict. For this reason the empirical analysis
needs to control for other possible explanations. Many empirical investigations of civil con-
ﬂicts include indicators of societal fractionalization, be it ethnic, religious or linguistic. Our
principal results are robust to controlling for the degree of heterogeneity in the population.
Artiﬁcially drawn post-colonial borders are thought to favour ethnic and territorial dis-
putes, especially in Africa. To control for this independent source of conﬂicts, our database
was updated with measures of fractionalization taken from Alesina et al.(2003), referring to
ethnic, language and religious dimensions. This is the most comprehensive source available
and the three indices range from zero (perfect homogeneity) to one (perfect heterogeneity or
49 Appendix Table 8 substitutes the level for the growth rate of income, while Table 9 reports the same
regressions using corruption control instead of bureaucratic quality.
50 The marginal eﬀect (and standard errors) of net forest depletion (nfd) is 0.007978(0.004473) in col-
umn 1 and 0.1806501(0.0836433) in column 2 and the marginal eﬀect of bureaucratic quality (bqua) is
-0.0164645(0.0042947) in column 1 and 0.0209756(0.0330079)in column 2. The marginal eﬀect of mineral
depletion is 0.0094178(0.0018715) and of bureaucratic quality -0.0146866(0.0042225) are strongly signiﬁcant
in column 3 but lose signiﬁcance in the IV regression in column 4. The rest of the marginal eﬀects are available
but not reported here.
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Variables 
 
            Dependent variable: inconflict5 
(1) Panel OLS   (2)IV         (3) Panel OLS       (4) IV        
         
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.0036**  -0.0041**  -0.0035**  -0.0014 
  (0.00163)  (0.00190)  (0.00171)  (0.0013) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.0578***  0.0230  0.0641***  -0.0032 
  (0.0156)  (0.0319)  (0.0151)  (0.0375) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.051***  -0.096  -0.050***  -0.0769* 
  (0.0117)  (0.0629)  (0.0115)  (0.0917) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.0269  -0.286**     
  (0.0164)  (0.134)     
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.0215***  0.352**     
  (0.00748)  (0.170)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)      -0.00789  0.0123 
      (0.00496)  (0.0092) 
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)      0.0146***  -0.0164 
      (0.00262)  (0.0136) 
Year  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.009*** 
  (0.000974)  (0.00162)  (0.000970)  (0.00117) 
Constant  21.26***  22.22***  20.16***  19.88*** 
  (1.934)  (3.144)  (1.927)  (3.175) 
Observations  2419  2208  2486  2235 
Groups  130  118  133  119 
           
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Figure 5: Instrumental variable approach
fractionalization) are calculated as:
fracj = 1 −
n X
i=1
s
2
ij
where sij is the share of group i in country j.51 Fractionalization is interpreted as the proba-
bility that two randomly chosen individuals belong to diﬀerent ethnic, linguistic or religious
group. Note that these are time-invariant measures52 and therefore justify the use of the ran-
51 i.e. Fractionalization equals 1 minus the respective group Herﬁndahl concentration index. See Alesina et
al. (2003), p. 159.
52 Although these fractionalization measures are in principle endogenous in the long-run, due to diverse
factors such as: diﬀerences in fertility rates across groups, migration, mixing, deﬁnitional changes and iden-
tity/aﬃliation shifts, they are shown to be very stable in a time frame of up to 30 years. See Alesina et al.
(2003), p. 161.
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Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 (Panel probit) 
        (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)                 
         
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.0264***  -0.0248***  -0.0222***  -0.0186** 
  (0.00923)  (0.00861)  (0.00760)  (0.00746) 
Population (ln,lag)  0.986***  0.971***  0.981***  1.013*** 
  (0.198)  (0.197)  (0.199)  (0.199) 
Corruption control (lag)  -0.416***    -0.367***   
  (0.0904)    (0.0805)   
Bureaucratic Quality (lag)    -0.542***    -0.465*** 
    (0.104)    (0.0950) 
Forrest depletion (lag)  -0.464*  -0.323**     
  (0.262)  (0.147)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)      -0.0813**  -0.0510* 
      (0.0335)  (0.0268) 
Corr*ForestDepl (lag)  0.139**       
  (0.0621)       
BurQual*ForestDepl (lag)    0.213**     
    (0.0878)     
Corr*MineralDepl (lag)      0.0605***   
      (0.0179)   
BurQual*MineralDepl (lag)        0.0960*** 
        (0.0263) 
Ethnic fractionalization  2.591*  2.063  2.695*  2.394 
  (1.575)  (1.562)  (1.543)  (1.527) 
Linguistic fractionalization  4.811***  4.995***  4.409***  4.589*** 
  (1.465)  (1.434)  (1.428)  (1.390) 
Religious fractionalization  -4.450***  -4.192***  -4.269***  -4.233*** 
  (1.298)  (1.312)  (1.260)  (1.265) 
Year  -0.127***  -0.120***  -0.123***  -0.119*** 
  (0.0111)  (0.0111)  (0.0113)  (0.0113) 
Constant  245.9***  231.7***  237.4***  229.5*** 
  (21.69)  (21.62)  (22.04)  (22.05) 
Observations  2352  2352  2411  2411 
Groups  126  126  128  128 
         
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 6: Civil conﬂict incidence and measures of fractionalization
dom eﬀects probit model. As Elbadawi and Sambanis note, a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation would
create multicollinearity between the ﬁxed individually-speciﬁc error-component and the time
invariant regressor.53 Results are presented in Figure 6, where we run our main regressions
using the two governance indicators and the three depletion indicators in turn, and adding
the three types of societal fragmentation mentioned above.
The table contains the previous panel probit speciﬁcation including lagged regressors and
53 See Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), p. 313.
28a time trend. First, it can be seen that the relationships of interest to us remain signiﬁcant in
all columns and change little in magnitude when the degree of fragmentation in the society
is controlled for. Second, the measures of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization in a society
have a positive inﬂuence on the likelihood of conﬂict:54 as hypothesized, some conﬂicts indeed
seem to have roots in ethnic divisions. Third, religious fractionalization indicator has the
opposite sign when the other two measures are included, but is not statistically signiﬁcant
when entered alone. This result is consistent with other studies in the literature and is
usually explained by the fact that religious aﬃliation is ‘more endogenous’ than the other
measures, as it is relatively easy to hide or change under an intolerant regime.55 The results are
again robust when using income per capita instead of income growth and the coeﬃcients are
provided in Figure 12 in the Appendix. The usefulness of these measures of fractionalization
in predicting civil strife has recently been questioned.56 Some authors consider polarization,
i.e. the division of society in comparably-sized clusters exhibiting strong diﬀerences, rather
than fractionalization to be a more meaningful determinant of conﬂict.57 When we add the
Raynal-Querol measures of ethnic and religious polarization and repeat the above exercise
in Appendix Figure 13, we ﬁnd that our results survive. In addition, we ﬁnd that ethnic
polarization is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the incidence of civil conﬂicts in the
sample, while religious polarization is not statistically signiﬁcant.
54 This result conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Hodler (2006). The latter paper’s
result that fractionalization is linked to the perpetuation of resource-related violence is driven by the assump-
tion that the number of rival groups in the society is inversely proportional to property rights enforcement,
and thus the productivity in legitimate economic activities.
55 e.g. Alesina et al.(2003), p. 167.
56 See Blattman and Miguel (2010), p. 27.
57 See Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004), Montalvo and Raynal-Querol (2005).
295. Conclusion
The paper presents a simple bargaining theoretical framework and then analyzes empiri-
cally the importance of governance quality indicators in conjunction with the level of depletion
of natural resources, as factors explaining the incidence of civil conﬂict. A Nash bargaining
process between locals and the government yields an equilibrium payoﬀ for the former that
depends on the quality of governance in an interesting way. In general, government corruption
has the direct eﬀect of lowering the policy-based component of the peasants’ utility, and the
indirect eﬀect of accelerating the exploitation of the resource and increasing the current ‘pie’
available to be shared. Thus, it is not unambiguously clear what is the relationship between
corruption and policy-driven discontent. A simple comparative statics on the equilibrium out-
come reveals a somewhat intriguing scenario: when the peasants are relatively less ‘greedy’
and the resource is relatively scarce, a more corrupt government leads to a lower likelihood
of conﬂict based on resource-policy discontent.
A panel data set containing a large cross section of countries during 20 recent years is used
to show that governance and depletion and their interaction appear, indeed, to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the chance for civil violence, lending support to a ‘grievance’ motive of conﬂict. In
order to increase the robustness of the empirical analysis, two diﬀerent resource depletion
variables have been chosen: net forest depletion and mineral depletion, in conjunction with
two diﬀerent quality of governance variables: corruption control and bureaucratic quality.
Even after taking several steps to account for the possible endogeneity of some regressors,
results conﬁrm that resource depletion and governance quality jointly inﬂuence the likelihood
civil conﬂict outcome. More speciﬁcally, a more corrupt government leads to an increased
chance of civil conﬂict, except in more depleted environments, where the opposite is the case.
This outcome may mean that in such cases the government is better able to ‘appease’ the
locals by oﬀering them side-payments or perhaps the distance between the capabilities of the
government and those of the locals is larger. This suggests that it is not inconceivable, at least
in some cases, that economic policy grievances are more than mere justiﬁcations used by rebels
30to mask their real objectives. In contrast to the appropriation channel which oﬀers little in
terms of policy advice, the resource policy mechanism yields the following policy prescription:
a more inclusive resource policy in conjunction with better overall economic conditions are
likely to decrease civil conﬂict incidence on average. More generally, establishing a link
between resource abundance and/or scarcity and civil conﬂicts requires an understanding of
the exploitation regime and the division of rents prevalent in the society.
Given the explicit modeling choices made in both the theoretical and the empirical sections,
the interpretation proposed here does not claim to be a universal explanation of civil conﬂict.
Nor is the empirical exercise solid proof that civil conﬂict is determined by resource depletion
grievances when the policy channel is by assumption unavailable or insuﬃcient to achieve a
political balance in society. Rather, this is an attempt to, on one hand, suggest that economic
analyses of conﬂict do not have to be premised on a priori dismissing legitimate causes but can
accommodate them, and on the other hand, to point at the fragility of what still constitutes
‘conventional wisdom’ in the empirical studies of civil conﬂict.
31APPENDIX:
Some of the most important variables in the dataset are detailed in the following table,
which also lists their respective sources:58
Variable Explanation Source
intensity Intensity of conﬂict in given year: 1-minor,2-war UCDP-PRIO
inconﬂict Dummy turns 1 when a conﬂict is ongoing in given year based on UCDP-PRIO
inconﬂict5 Dummy turns 1 if conﬂict in the next 5 years based on UCDP-PRIO
intensitymax5 Maximum intensity of conﬂict in the next 5 years based on UCDP-PRIO
pop Population (deﬂated) W.D.I.
gdp cap GDP per capita (deﬂated) W.D.I.
gdp growth GDP growth (annual %) W.D.I.
gini Gini index W.D.I.
food exp Food exports (% of merchandise exp.) W.D.I.
fuel exp Fuel exports (% of merchandise exp.) W.D.I.
metalore exp Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exp.) W.D.I.
polity2 Revised combined polity score POLITY IV project
ans end Energy Depletion A.N.S.
ans mid Minerals Depletion A.N.S.
ans nfd Net Forest Depletion A.N.S.
cor Corruption PRS-ICRG
bqua Bureaucratic Quality PRS-ICRG
58 The following abbreviations have been used: UCDP-PRIO= Uppsala Conﬂict Data Project-International
Peace Research Institute Oslo, W.D.I= World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006), ANS database =
Adjusted Net Savings Indicators (World Bank, 2006), PRS-ICRG = International Country Risk Guide from
the Political Risk Services.
32Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 (PanelProbit) 
         (1)                         (2)                       (3)                     (4)                    (5)                       (6) 
             
Gdp/cap ppp (lag)  0.009  -0.026  0.001  -0.034  0.028  -0.029 
  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.996***  0.956***  0.952***  0.956***  0.968***  0.923*** 
  (0.261)  (0.248)  (0.254)  (0.219)  (0.258)  (0.278) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.561***    -0.467***    -0.613***   
  (0.108)    (0.100)    (0.103)   
Corruption control (lag)    -0.425***    -0.350***    -0.446*** 
    (0.088)    (0.080)    (0.080) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.109  -0.205         
  (0.164)  (0.188)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.027  -0.024     
      (0.017)  (0.020)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.422***  -0.327*** 
          (0.081)  (0.092) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.212**           
  (0.087)           
Corruption*ForestDep (lag)    0.121**         
    (0.059)         
Bur.Qual*EnergyDep (lag)      0.007       
      (0.008)       
Corruption*EnergyDep (lag)        0.002     
        (0.007)     
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)          0.301***   
          (0.059)   
Corruption*MinDep (lag)            0.120*** 
            (0.031) 
Year  -0.123***  -0.126***  -0.120***  -0.121***  -0.127***  -0.124*** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Constant  238.074***  244.297***  233.676***  235.719***  246.343***  242.220*** 
  (23.103)  (21.792)  (21.494)  (21.025)  (22.735)  (22.491) 
Observations  2376  2376  2436  2436  2436  2436 
Groups  126  126  128  128  128  128 
             
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 7: Robustness checks (Figure 3 in text): GDP /capita level
33Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 
(1) Panel OLS   (2)IV         (3) Panel OLS       (4) IV       (5) Panel OLS       (6) IV 
Gdp/cap ppp (lag)  0.00690***  0.0271*  0.00544**  0.0282*  0.00761***  0.0131 
  (0.00222)  (0.0143)  (0.00214)  (0.0159)  (0.00214)  (0.0178) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.0675***  0.0503*  0.0715***  0.0694***  0.0749***  0.0963*** 
  (0.0172)  (0.0260)  (0.0166)  (0.0114)  (0.0168)  (0.0141) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.0533***  -0.292*  -0.0437***  -0.313**  -0.0659***  -0.212 
  (0.0105)  (0.163)  (0.0104)  (0.141)  (0.00989)  (0.168) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.00854  -0.367**        0.0431*** 
  (0.0135)  (0.148)        (0.0123) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.0190***  0.418***         
  (0.00712)  (0.160)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.00248  0.0721***     
      (0.00201)  (0.0184)     
Bur.Qual*EnergyDep (lag)      0.000512  -0.0391***     
      (0.000897)  (0.0103)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.0376***   
          (0.00622)   
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)          0.0254***  0.0168** 
          (0.00307)  (0.00714) 
Year  -0.0120***  -0.0151***  -0.0114***  -0.0196***  -0.0118***  -0.0123*** 
  (0.00103)  (0.00209)  (0.00101)  (0.00312)  (0.00101)  (0.00198) 
Constant  23.96***  30.40***  22.61***  39.40***  23.55***  24.72*** 
  (2.020)  (4.296)  (1.977)  (6.346)  (1.977)  (4.052) 
Observations  2376  2167  2436  2197  2436  2169 
Groups  126  121  128  122  128  121 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 8: Robustness checks (Figure 5 in text): GDP /capita level
Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 
(1) Panel OLS         (2)IV              (3) Panel OLS        (4) IV               (5) Panel OLS       (6) IV 
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.00347***  -0.000864  -0.00299***  0.000832  -0.00349***  -0.00207* 
  (0.00106)  (0.00136)  (0.00102)  (0.00249)  (0.00102)  (0.00120) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.0612***  0.0538***  0.0630***  0.0684***  0.0640***  0.0552*** 
  (0.0168)  (0.0144)  (0.0167)  (0.0128)  (0.0166)  (0.0172) 
Corruption control  -0.0464***  -0.0867***  -0.0426***  -0.100***  -0.0501***  -0.0966** 
  (0.00758)  (0.0308)  (0.00746)  (0.0290)  (0.00721)  (0.0385) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.0219  0.274***        0.00538 
  (0.0226)  (0.104)        (0.0107) 
Cor.ctrl*ForestDep (lag)  0.00752  -0.104**         
  (0.00762)  (0.0420)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.00185  -0.0827     
      (0.00211)  (0.0555)     
Cor.ctrl*EnergyDep (lag)      -2.51e-05  0.0361     
      (0.000745)  (0.0240)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.0155***   
          (0.00433)   
Cor.ctrl*MineralDep (lag)          0.0102***  -0.00282 
          (0.00199)  (0.00232) 
Year  -0.0128***  -0.0158***  -0.0124***  -0.00796  -0.0124***  -0.0156*** 
  (0.000954)  (0.00150)  (0.000942)  (0.00528)  (0.000952)  (0.00179) 
Constant  25.60***  31.77***  24.94***  16.10  24.79***  31.42*** 
  (1.890)  (3.065)  (1.864)  (10.58)  (1.886)  (3.685) 
Observations  2419  2208  2486  2235  2486  2208 
Groups  130  118  133  119  133  118 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 9: Robustness checks (Figure 5 in text): Corruption control
34Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 
(1) Panel OLS      (2)IV                  (3) Panel OLS       (4) IV           (5) Panel OLS       (6) IV 
Gdp/cap ppp (lag)  0.00690***  0.0174  0.00544**  0.00568  0.00761***  0.0221** 
  (0.00222)  (0.0470)  (0.00214)  (0.0699)  (0.00214)  (0.00892) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.0675***  0.114*  0.0715***  0.0968  0.0749***  -0.0488 
  (0.0172)  (0.0603)  (0.0166)  (0.622)  (0.0168)  (0.0997) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.0533***  -0.269  -0.0437***  -0.0501  -0.0659***  -0.0414 
  (0.0105)  (0.635)  (0.0104)  (0.613)  (0.00989)  (0.376) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.00854  0.348        -0.0162 
  (0.0135)  (0.296)        (0.0502) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.0190***  -0.409         
  (0.00712)  (0.369)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.00248  -0.108     
      (0.00201)  (0.586)     
Bur.Qual*EnergyDep 
(lag) 
    0.000512  0.0660     
      (0.000897)  (0.367)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.0376***   
          (0.00622)   
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)          0.0254***  -0.00685 
          (0.00307)  (0.00902) 
Year  -0.0120***  -0.0100***  -0.0114***  -0.00972  -0.0118***  -0.0136*** 
  (0.00103)  (0.00269)  (0.00101)  (0.0239)  (0.00101)  (0.00472) 
Constant  23.96***  20.23***  22.61***  19.22  23.55***  27.55*** 
  (2.020)  (5.317)  (1.977)  (48.84)  (1.977)  (8.262) 
Observations  2376  2182  2436  2202  2436  2182 
Groups  126  115  128  115  128  115 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 10: Robustness checks (Figure 5 in text): Only ‘state antiquity’ as instrument
Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 
(1) Panel OLS      (2)IV                    (3) Panel OLS       (4) IV             (5) Panel OLS       (6) IV 
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.00356***  -0.00496*  -0.00303***  -0.00143  -0.00349***  -0.00232* 
  (0.00106)  (0.00272)  (0.00102)  (0.00178)  (0.00102)  (0.00119) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.0578***  0.00534  0.0626***  0.0660***  0.0641***  0.0545*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0470)  (0.0163)  (0.0169)  (0.0164)  (0.0204) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.0512***  -0.0219  -0.0397***  -0.0868  -0.0497***  -0.0476 
  (0.0100)  (0.170)  (0.0101)  (0.110)  (0.00944)  (0.113) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.0269**  -0.404*        -0.0109 
  (0.0124)  (0.231)        (0.0199) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep 
(lag) 
0.0215***  0.520*         
  (0.00692)  (0.300)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.00231  0.0167     
      (0.00196)  (0.0445)     
Bur.Qual*EnergyDep 
(lag) 
    0.000449  -0.0118     
      (0.000893)  (0.0300)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.00789**   
          (0.00350)   
Bur.Qual*MinDep 
(lag) 
        0.0146***  -0.00339 
          (0.00246)  (0.00623) 
Year  -0.0106***  -0.0122***  -0.0104***  -0.0110***  -0.0101***  -0.0112*** 
  (0.000929)  (0.00291)  (0.000921)  (0.00157)  (0.000922)  (0.00163) 
Constant  21.26***  24.48***  20.80***  22.19***  20.16***  22.50*** 
  (1.830)  (5.538)  (1.814)  (3.014)  (1.817)  (3.040) 
Observations  2419  2208  2486  2235  2486  2208 
Groups  130  118  133  119  133  118 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 11: Robustness checks (Figure 5 in text): Only ‘state antiquity’ as instrument
35Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 (Panel probit) 
        (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)                  (5)                 (6) 
             
Gdp/capita ppp (lag)  0.038  0.074**  0.030  0.063*  0.038  0.097*** 
  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.036) 
Population (ln,lag)  1.087***  1.148***  1.150***  1.245***  1.131***  1.349*** 
  (0.208)  (0.227)  (0.217)  (0.234)  (0.216)  (0.244) 
Corruption control (lag)  -0.368***    -0.294***    -0.405***   
  (0.0914)    (0.0838)    (0.0841)   
Bureaucratic Quality (lag)    -0.553***    -0.439***    -0.626*** 
    (0.112)    (0.104)    (0.108) 
Forrest depletion (lag)  -0.141  -0.125         
  (0.191)  (0.160)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.013  -0.014     
      (0.0203)  (0.0178)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.328***  -0.464*** 
          (0.0939)  (0.0857) 
Corr*ForestDepl (lag)  0.105*           
  (0.0600)           
BurQual*ForestDepl (lag)    0.206**         
    (0.0888)         
Corr*EnergyDepl (lag)      0.000179       
      (0.00687)       
BurQual*EnergyDepl (lag)        0.00203     
        (0.00865)     
Corr*MineralDepl (lag)          0.121***   
          (0.0320)   
BurQual*MineralDepl (lag)            0.337*** 
            (0.0657) 
Ethnic fractionalization  2.148  2.306  2.271  2.434  2.262  3.399* 
  (1.639)  (1.727)  (1.670)  (1.760)  (1.682)  (1.885) 
Linguistic fractionalization  5.189***  5.563***  5.432***  5.822***  5.325***  5.776*** 
  (1.440)  (1.476)  (1.469)  (1.510)  (1.468)  (1.587) 
Religious fractionalization  -4.716***  -4.833***  -4.769***  -4.977***  -4.614***  -5.593*** 
  (1.268)  (1.360)  (1.288)  (1.370)  (1.272)  (1.430) 
Year  -0.131***  -0.130***  -0.128***  -0.131***  -0.133***  -0.141*** 
  (0.0119)  (0.0124)  (0.0119)  (0.0125)  (0.0124)  (0.0136) 
Constant  252.8***  249.9***  247.4***  251.6***  256.2***  269.5*** 
  (23.11)  (23.92)  (23.05)  (24.07)  (24.09)  (26.11) 
Observations  2308  2308  2368  2368  2368  2368 
Groups  122  122  124  124  124  124 
             
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 12: Robustness checks (Figure 6 in text): Gdp/capita level
36Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 (Panel probit) 
        (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)                  (5)                 (6) 
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.0226**  -0.0207**  -0.0150*  -0.0131  -0.0170**  -0.0144* 
  (0.0108)  (0.00902)  (0.00813)  (0.00799)  (0.00785)  (0.00770) 
Population (ln,lag)  1.044***  0.945***  0.961***  0.971***  0.944***  0.968*** 
  (0.252)  (0.338)  (0.238)  (0.258)  (0.270)  (0.269) 
Corruption control (lag)  -0.544***    -0.390***    -0.418***   
  (0.0936)    (0.0828)    (0.0797)   
Forrest depletion (lag)  -0.516  -0.304**         
  (0.330)  (0.152)         
Corr*ForestDepl (lag)  0.178***           
  (0.0620)           
Bureaucratic Quality (lag)    -0.654***    -0.516***    -0.531*** 
    (0.107)    (0.0997)    (0.0947) 
BurQual*ForestDepl (lag)    0.255***         
    (0.0927)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.0333  -0.0359**     
      (0.0205)  (0.0174)     
Corr*EnergyDepl (lag)      0.00232       
      (0.00681)       
BurQual*EnergyDepl (lag)        0.00757     
        (0.00844)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.0792**  -0.0466* 
          (0.0318)  (0.0261) 
Corr*MineralDepl (lag)          0.0531***   
          (0.0181)   
BurQual*MineralDepl (lag)            0.0849*** 
            (0.0264) 
Ethnic Polarization  
(Reynal-Querol) 
3.654**  3.543**  3.504***  3.613***  3.278***  3.343*** 
  (1.607)  (1.501)  (1.161)  (1.185)  (1.215)  (1.218) 
Religious Polarization  
(Reynal-Querol) 
0.974  0.725  1.019  0.844  0.874  0.871 
  (1.016)  (0.938)  (0.817)  (0.839)  (0.820)  (0.855) 
Year  -0.126***  -0.115***  -0.120***  -0.117***  -0.119***  -0.116*** 
  (0.0115)  (0.0124)  (0.0109)  (0.0111)  (0.0114)  (0.0114) 
Constant  242.3***  221.8***  230.7***  224.2***  230.4***  222.4*** 
  (22.16)  (23.56)  (21.15)  (21.54)  (22.08)  (22.00) 
Observations  2145  2145  2201  2201  2201  2201 
Groups  106  106  109  109  109  109 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 13: Robustness checks (Figure 6 in text): Ethnic and Religious Polarization
37Variables 
 
Dependent variable: inconflict5 (Panel Fixed Effects Logit) 
        (1)                 (2)                   (3)                 (4)                  (5)                  (6) 
             
Gdp growth (lag)  -0.047***  -0.047***  -0.024*  -0.026**  -0.028**  -0.030** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Population (ln, lag)  0.570  3.109  1.944  3.139  1.069  2.432 
  (2.157)  (2.166)  (1.970)  (1.949)  (1.920)  (1.900) 
Bur.Quality (lag)  -0.949***    -0.676***    -0.753***   
  (0.197)    (0.177)    (0.173)   
Corruption control (lag)    -0.675***    -0.428***    -0.489*** 
    (0.165)    (0.141)    (0.139) 
Forest Depletion (lag)  -0.994***  -1.284***         
  (0.296)  (0.380)         
Energy Depletion (lag)      -0.0776**  -0.0750*     
      (0.0362)  (0.0429)     
Mineral Depletion (lag)          -0.107**  -0.127** 
          (0.0531)  (0.0546) 
Bur.Qual*ForestDep (lag)  0.291           
  (0.192)           
Corruption*ForestDep (lag)    0.249**         
    (0.105)         
Bur.Qual*EnergyDep (lag)      0.0107       
      (0.0157)       
Corruption*EnergyDep (lag)        0.00386     
        (0.0146)     
Bur.Qual*MinDep (lag)          0.158***   
          (0.0536)   
Corruption*MinDep (lag)            0.0934*** 
            (0.0327) 
Year  -0.185***  -0.245***  -0.220***  -0.245***  -0.196***  -0.225*** 
  (0.0495)  (0.0505)  (0.0461)  (0.0460)  (0.0449)  (0.0445) 
Observations  785  785  793  793  793  793 
Groups  39  39  40  40  40  40 
             
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Figure 14: Robustness checks: ﬁxed eﬀects (panel) logit
As an additional robustness check we ran a pooled probit regression of the baseline speciﬁca-
tion: inconﬂict5 on lagged gdp growth, population, bureaucratic quality, net forest depletion,
the interaction between governance and depletion and a time trend. All the main results
carry over. In particular, the marginal eﬀect of the interaction is as expected. Here are the
plots of the interaction eﬀects following the Norton and Ai (2003) procedure implemented in
Stata’s inteff command:
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Figure 15: Interaction eﬀect Bureaucratic Quality ∗ Net Forest Depletion (based on a probit regression)
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